Collaborating with the ‘Enemy': Overcoming Practical Limitation to Early Warning and Early Response

Table of Contents

Executive Summary. 7

Our Capacity. 8

The Team.. 8

A New Early Warning System.. 9

Operational obstacles. 10

Challenges of creating this system.. 11

Mobile technology. 11

The basic architecture of a SMS early warning system.. 12

Traditional Forms of Early Warning and Early Response: An Overview.. 14

Data Collection and Analysis. 15

Qualitative. 15

Quantitative. 15

Qualitative and Quantitative. 16

Network. 16

The argument for a paradigm-shift in the current practice. 17

Early Warning is futile in the absence of Early Response. 17

The Need for Localized Early Warning and Early Response. 18

Works Cited. 19

Executive Summary

Conventional EW and ER systems are situated far from conflict contexts to enable effective early response. Whereas the monitoring and analysis are conducted mainly in the West, actual conflicting situations are located in Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, East Asia, South East Asia and South Asia. Due to the geographic and cultural differences, the early warning agencies in the West have little influence over the institutions that could execute preventive diplomacy in actual conflict. Multilateral agencies like the UN and even powerful state actors have been unable to garner enough confidence in people as mechanisms for early intervention due to issues of expressed state sovereignty, lack of interest etc. As a result, early response is less likely to follow early warning. In addition to this, the distance between the possible conflict areas and the West lowers international community's motivation to intervene.

Secondly, they exclude micro level conflict scenarios and the contributing factors and focus on country stability. The unit of analysis in the conventional EW and ER systems is states; they focus on identifying the states where violent conflict may take place. As Sri Lanka illustrates, while there is a high-intensity armed conflict between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), there exist a low intensity insurgency and terrorism and conflicts between ethnic, political and sometimes religious groups. Similar conditions can be observed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Mindanao etc. In order to response to such complex situation, the international society is not the best actor.

The need is for an indigenous early warning mechanism that works with local authorities for transformation and change at all levels of engagement utilizing the best and most appropriate technology available. The data gathering focus should go beyond a mixture of qualitative and quantitative and network methods to include some form of alignment or cross-checking with covert information or HUMINT (security sector information).

The traditional methods employed by the human rights sector and local civil society groups is the ‘naming and shaming' of the state actor at the international level with little or no real response from the international community at all. This often leads to backlashes with the powerful state actor declaring war on non-state actors providing a human rights function. Powerful state actors like the United States and China have even challenged the legitimacy of the information disseminated by even the most established multinational agencies[1] and even transnational human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The situation is further compounded by a resulting misunderstanding and antagonism between humanitarian agencies and the state actors in question. This practice should undergo a paradigm shift. As civil society activists, seeing results often requires that we ‘work with' the state actor, particularly when it is elected through a democratic process rather than ‘working against' that state actor. The information gathering, analysis and early response mechanisms must be linked to legitimate state actors and national interests for those in power to consider seriously the warnings generated by these systems and to take appropriate action in response.

The proposal is to create a strategy for a pilot program in Sri Lanka combining localized EW/ER systems with mobile technology that gathers, analyzes and recognizes patters in both overt and covert information relating to human rights and humanitarian information on the ground with immediate affect. The strategy is to prevent the loss of around 200,000 lives in the immediate short-term in the island's north east, an area surrounded by the Sri Lankan military where numerous human rights abuses are reported. The next phase of the Sri Lankan conflict is already emerging. It is a low intensity insurgency in a highly mono-ethnic region and terrorist (including suicide attacks). Backlashes by the military against civilian populations considered to be ‘harboring' the insurgents/terrorists are possible over the next 3-5 years. This calls for a more proactive method of extracting correct information and acting upon that information in a timely fashion through the relevant stakeholders and a transformation of spoilers into stakeholders overtime.

Our Capacity

 

The Team

 

Primary Applicant Madhawa "Mads" Palihapitiya is a Conflict Resolution Practitioner from Sri Lanka. He engaged in high-risk mediation and conflict prevention efforts involving the two warring parties of Sri Lanka from 2002 onwards. He was the head of a British-funded Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit at the Foundation for Co-Existence. The Early Warning/ Early Response system was originally planned for the volatile Eastern Province of Sri Lanka from 2003 and later expanded to other parts of Sri Lanka thus preventing over 100 documented cases of direct violence, including riots. It is still in operation today. Madhawa obtained his Masters in Conflict Resolution from Brandeis University in 2007 and is currently the Associate Director at the Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution and Public Collaboration in Boston, Massachusetts. Madhawa has done extensive research on violence, including the non-Islamic suicide bombing phenomenon in Sri Lanka and also on violence prevention. He has extensive contacts and networks with both the human rights lobby and also the military in Sri Lanka.

 

Contact Details: Madhawa "Mads" Palihapitiya

Associate Director,

MA Office of Dispute Resolution & Public Collaboration (MODR)

UMass Boston | 100 Morrissey Blvd., M-1-613 | Boston, MA 02125

Tel: 617.287.4036 | Fax: 617.287.4049

E-mail: Madhawa.Palihapitiya@umb.edu

Pasan Manitha is a software and network engineer who graduated from Deakin University Australia. He is currently in charge of internet security at SunCorp in Brisbane Australia.

Ishan B. Mendis is a software engineer specializing in Artificial Intelligence ans has worked on several defence contracts involving defence-related Early Warning Systems in Southeast Asia.

A New Early Warning System

The proposed micro-level EW and ER system goes beyond what are called ‘Third, Fourth or Fifth Generation EW and ER systems' and is characterized by:

1. Civil society/NGO collaborations with the state and security sectors

2. Humanitarian networks, quantitative and qualitative data and analysis integrated with security sector information (HUMINT) and analysis

3. Ability to become an added value to the operations of a standing army providing advocacy support on humanitarian conditions, political conditions, social conditions etc available before, during or after military action

4. Locally owned, operated, funded and managed systems and processes

5. Self-contained units that avoid ‘naming and shaming' but promotes social capital formation with civilians, elected or appointed officials alike through personal networking, demonstrated local accountability, readily accessible policy and advocacy support to state actors as and when required.

6. Operates primarily in the geographical area prone to violence. EW and ER mechanisms, including technology to extract information are housed within the same geographical area.

Operational obstacles

The prototype of the current EW systems began to be used in two domains: (1) the military strategic intelligence in order to gather information to predict an attack and (2) humanitarian and natural disasters such as drought and famine, which is exemplified by the United Nations Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS). The current EW systems focusing on ethno-political conflict developed from the latter. Human rights groups have, due to reasons of inaccessibility or misunderstanding, intentionally or unintentionally separated early warning and early response from military strategic intelligence.

Although at first glance it is virtually impossible to operate together, security sector agencies, even members of the intelligence community have a lot in common with human rights groups conducting early warning. Though the ends might differ, the means are quite similar in more occasions than not and at times the obstacles to cooperation seem superficial in many ways. The intelligence community, particularly military intelligence (not secret intelligence) has a definite need for systematically gathered and verified humanitarian information particularly for counter insurgency and counter terrorism operations. These can be described as follows:

1. Avoiding collateral damage- Insurgents/ terrorists may operate among civilian populations like ‘fish in the water'; water being the civilian population and fish being the insurgents/terrorists. Seasoned military experts will know the impact of measuring public attitudes towards a military to determine the possibility of infiltration by insurgents and terrorists into civilian populations.
2. Creation of social capital outcomes like confidence, generation of respect and trust between the military and a civilian population. Availability of humanitarian information and contacts could rebuild broken bridges between a standing army and civilians. This will definitely enhance and support the military's operational success in long-term engagements. Humanitarian information networks will help identify strengths, weaknesses, threats and challenges to the development of social capital like a barometer embedded within the community.
3. Humanitarian agencies may have better physical as well as informational access to civilian populations. Access to information results in qualitative data and analysis, which could round-up an army's military intelligence data and analysis.

Responsible humanitarian agencies working in collaboration with security sector agencies can benefit in numerous ways. A few of these benefits are as follows:

1. Human rights groups have access to only overt information, which in many cases is inadequate in situations of high intensity, low-intensity and proxy wars.
2. Human rights experts working closely with the security sector could not only gain access to better quality data but also be in a position to influence security sector reform, at least temporarily to avoid collateral damage and its harmful repercussions. There is a definite gain in this in terms of prevention violence and violations.
3. Ensuring early action could become highly effective if the military actor is willing to provide at least some basic support on the ground. Human rights groups have no local authority. Working together with those in authority can improve chances of early response.
4. Social capital gains like trust between state and non-state actors such as military and human rights professionals has a definite gain on violence prevention, political and economic stability, human rights etc. These personal networks can add value to the quality of human rights work.
5. In disaster situations regardless of whether they are man-made or natural, a military can offer faster humanitarian responses than human rights or humanitarian groups. Militaries can function better and faster either on their own or in support of aid agencies (the military has fixed and movable assets from shelter, kitchens to trained manpower, transport and highly organized logistics).

Challenges of creating this system

1. Advanced yet readily available and safe mobile technology for secure data extraction, dissemination for analysis and feedback to and from a secured centralized unit.
2. The ability to transform the way information is collected and disseminated through the use of affordable, simple to operate technology.
3. Safety or concealment of identity of the data collectors is a high priority
4. Safety of the data collected, results of the analysis and secure storage of information is critical
5. Field-level qualitative, quantitative, network and HUMINT must be sustained with overt/public sources of information such as newsfeeds, websites, keyword searches (including native languages)
6. Visual presentation of the information collected and analyzed must lead to better interpretation, use and testing of the data through a core group of civil society operatives and security sector networks (HUMINT) through secure networks and technology on the ground (two way communication)

Mobile technology

The foremost method of information dissemination from the field is mobile technology. Among the various forms of mobile technology, mobile phones or cellular phones are fast becoming the most readily available technology for communicating information back and forth from the field before, during or after a conflict. Text Messaging or Short Message Services (SMS) was used extensively in early warning systems in Sri Lanka and is now becoming famous in African countries like Nigeria for example.

Many of these systems use GSM technology. Mobile units are cheap and so are the SMS-ing charges. A basic mobile unit/cell phone can be purchased under $40. The safety of the sender can be concealed as the information gets disseminated and the message does not reveal the original sender in the message, although with some effort it maybe possible to trace it back to the originator. Many GSM providers offer pre-paid connections through SIM cards sold in market places in many developing countries. These SIM cards can be purchased without registering your name and can be discarded along with the unit in case of a clear and present danger. Although other more sophisticated devices like Palmtops are available in many developing countries, these are not affordable to many. 3rd Generation GSM networks providing internet access through WAP for example are rare or available only in large cities.

The downside to SMS technology is in the transmittal of early warnings simultaneously to all relevant stakeholders from Track I to Track III level. There is often a delay between the messages when sending group messages using a mobile phone. This can however be overcome through mobile stations like the Huawei E220 HSPDA USB that supports bulk transmittal of text messages from a single or multiple sources. Depending on the requirement, these messages can be turned into email messages by using mobile partner software (PABX).

Another downside is the dependency on the service provider, which in some countries might not be that reliable or even secure, thus either delaying the warning or jeopardizing the identity of the members in the group. In addition, much more sophisticated technology maybe available to some powerful state actors to ‘eavesdrop' on conversations or intercept text messages based on their interest and capacity. In terms of major disasters, mobile phone networks might get overloaded and collapse. In certain other occasions, mobile services can be interrupted on purpose by influential actors (military or the state) in particular areas, thus preventing the exchange of vital information. But low-cost GSM technology has the potential to become the frontrunner in the field of early warning and quick exchange of human rights and humanitarian information in many countries.

The basic architecture of a SMS early warning system

Traditional Forms of Early Warning and Early Response: An Overview

EW is now a manifold field which has a number of unique systems dealing with a wide range of issues. For example, Future of Global Interdependence (FUGI), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Right Violations (PIOOM) deal with human rights violations. Early Recognition of Tensions and Fact-finding (FAST), Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER, which does not exist now), International Crisis Group (ICG) focus on ethno-political conflict. Life Integrity Violations Approach (LIVA) deals with genocides and politicides. Minority at Risk (MAR) literally focuses on minorities based on the assumption that future violent rebellion will be begun by groups who are most at risk. ReliefWeb (UNDHA) focuses on complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE) which is ‘a profound social crisis in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement owing to man-made and natural disasters, while some others may benefit from it'. Moreover, there are a broad variety of actors involved in these systems from grassroots projects to academics working on computer systems.

Although there are various systems, issues to deal with and actors in EW and ER, their basic purposes are very simple: to identify the causes of conflict, to predict the outbreak of conflict and to mitigate that conflict. In order to achieve these goals, the following six steps are taken in order:(1) data collection, (2) data analysis, (3) assessment for warning or identification of different scenarios, (4) formulate an action proposals, (5) transmit recommendations and (6) assess the early response. In the following part, EW and ER are explained and some issues concerning them are discussed along with the above division.

Data Collection and Analysis

The methodologies of data collection and data analysis are divided into four by Austin: qualitative, quantitative, qualitative and quantitative, and network, of which, quantitative approaches and qualitative approaches have long been in rivalry. The details of each methodology will be discussed below.

Qualitative

Some significant problems exist with this method. For example, there are the problems of noise and information overload. In addition, it is seen as too subjective. It is feared that the data collected by qualitative approaches are biased. It implies that some intervention recommendations based on qualitative researches are not taken seriously or questioned by decision makers. With regard to this subjectivity, harsh criticism is given by Moore and Gurr. They state that area experts, or correspondents, are generally skeptical about quantitative approaches because they think that substantive knowledge and understanding are crucial for risk assessments and early warnings. However, they state, these people also use criteria and rules, but their general criteria are seldom explicitly stated. They contend that explicit statement of the criteria and decision rules - the transparency and the replicability of the criteria and decision rules is a virtue. The next approach, quantitative, follows the virtue.

Quantitative

In the field of EW, there are still too few systematic attempts to test the predictive power of individual indicators or group of indicators empirically. According to Schmid, such testing can be done in two ways:

1. Prospective: Establish which past forecasts turned out to be correct, copy the methodology, and reapply it to present cases for which one requires forecasts.

2. Retrospective: Engage in post diction, i.e., "forecast" with indicators and models created after the phenomenon to be forecasted has already occurred. Apply these indicators to past situations where the outcome is known, using data antedating those outcomes.

A similar argument is made by Brecke, who insists that there are two types of data to be distinguished:

1) the data that will help us to figure out the best early warning indicators

2) the data that is gathered to serve as those indicators

Brecke states that most practitioners interested in EW want only the second type of data. However, according to him, the first type of data must be identified for better and more accurate EW systems.

Although there are five sub-groups in quantitative approaches, they share the same weaknesses. Ramsbotham et al states that "these statistical approaches blur the case-specific and context-specific information which area experts would use".

Qualitative and Quantitative

The most well-known system of this nature is the Early Recognition of Tensions and Fact Finding (FAST) of the Swiss Peace Foundation. This system utilizes four sources: constant monitoring (qualitative analysis), event data analysis (quantitative analysis), expert network (external expertise), and fact finding missions (field investigations). These sources feed into the core outputs which are (a) Country Risk Profile: baseline studies, risk assessment, policy options and supportive data (b) Updates (regular, executive summary, risk assessment and supportive data). Discourse over the best analytical method for early warning has culminated in an understanding that both quantitative and qualitative strategies are needed for adequate early warning analysis.

Network

Fourthly, networks cooperate with one another to share field reports and information both from NGOs as well as inter-governmental agencies. They require some type of central coordination and have the advantage of being more cost effective than conducting repetitive field studies. They continue to offer the greatest chances for bridging the divide between the private and public sectors. Through a network system, well-balanced information in terms of qualitative and quantitative data can be collected. This system enables one to take a more holistic approach in order to anticipate the emergence of conflict by using existing early warning systems.

The argument for a paradigm-shift in the current practice

Early Warning is futile in the absence of Early Response

EW itself does not have a great effect on conflict without an appropriate response. ER is defined as ‘process of consultation, policy making, planning, and action to reduce or avoid armed conflict'. These processes include: diplomatic/political, military/security, humanitarian, and development/economic activity. The tragedies that unfolded in Rwanda and Kosovo are examples of failures on the part of international politics and inaction or late reactions by powerful militaries/security agencies.

Ramsbotham et al state that "there is already sufficient knowledge of situations where there is proneness to war to justify an appropriate response. For some time it has been realized that the key issue is not, in fact, providing early warning, but mustering the political resources to make an appropriate early response". In addition, "it is insufficient to assume that early response will follow from making sure that the right information is given at the right time to the right department or person. Man is not a rational animal". Therefore, the way of integrating early warning and early response has been one of the greatest challenges for many in this field.

Developing countries such as India, Pakistan, Algeria and Egypt oppose the principle of prevention, seeing it as a platform for greater external interference in their internal affairs. Similarly, some third world countries equate short-term preventive diplomacy with Western prevention.

FEWER, which is categorized as a ‘network' EW and ER system states that responses to conflict need to be concerted and integrated. NGOs, governments and intergovernmental organizations have to work together, at different levels (local, regional, and international), and in different sectors (such as diplomacy, development, trade and security) to comprehensively address the causes and dynamics of conflict. What is important in these arguments is that local NGOs and civil societies must be included as intervention actors, which enables early warning to be wired laterally.

Moreover, by making government a partner and enabling intergovernmental collaboration, it enables one to overcome the problem of the norm of sovereignty and no-interference. In addition, accountability among policy makers is also significant since EW information and response to this information are normally confidential, or outside of the public domain. By combining government actors, security/military actors with civil society actors, a self-contained local early warning and early action mechanism can emerge resulting in the prevention of violence, accountability, empowerment and even social capital gains.

The Need for Localized Early Warning and Early Response

Stedman points out that ‘the striking aspect of the performance of foreign policy experts over the last ten years has been their inability to predict the most important political changes. Few scholars foretold the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and no one forecast accurately when such events would take place'. The situation is much worse when it comes to predicting trends in insurgencies, terrorism and even armed conflict in developing countries. Early warning systems based in developed counties issue qualitative and or quantitative assessments on political stability etc., which are far from accurate and have no follow-up action.

Casey Barrs contends that early warning should be wired toward those who are about to be attacked. The rationale of this ‘people-centred early warning' is that endangered population is most motivated to respond to warnings and best positioned in terms of local knowledge and tactical options to react to warnings immediately. However, according to him, most of the literatures about conflict EW refer to regional or international mechanisms. ‘They are egocentric in that they are primarily built by outsiders to be used by outsiders', he state. According to him, this is relevant to a fundamental orientation which exists in the West; ‘we are the rescuers; that aid does not start until we arrive'.

In order to implement the people-centered early warning and early preparation, he advocates Locally-Led Advance Mobile Aid (LLAMA). One of the LLAMA's purposes is to help form teams of locals who have been recruited, trained, equipped, and deployed back home to help them do these things since local people are often too overwhelmed to devise this level of tactical planning by themselves. Locals often do not believe their own government will kill them and do not recognize rumors as truth until it is too late. Second, they often just hope they can accommodate the rebels or murderers coming their way.

Early warning needs to be unique to the situation, counterintuitive and draw attention to what could be done, while this is not always the case with the majority of the early warning systems in operation today. If the accuracy of prediction is 100%, people will more likely (or must) respond to the alarm. Since it is not realistic to expect 100% correct prediction considering the nature of an armed conflict or society in which the armed conflict emerges, one must increase the accuracy of prediction, for example, up to 90% or more.

The accuracy of prediction has been improving rapidly. With the development of automated data-coding systems, the reliability of quantitative approaches has been greatly enhanced. For example, although this does not mean the direct improvement of accuracy in prediction, VRA's formal reliability in-house test, which was conducted in 2000, resulted in the range of accuracy from 70% to 80.

These results are comparable (indeed favorable if one considers the type of error) with large-scale human coding efforts. In a more recent test of events involving use of force in Egypt and Tajikistan, Jenkins, Abbott & Taylor find terminal level reliabilities in the 80- 90% range. In addition, the combination approach of qualitative and quantitative illustrated by FAST system, which employs VRA automated coding method, makes the prediction of conflict more accurate and holistic. Its analysis of the risk of an armed conflict is based on event data analysis, constant monitoring, fact finding mission and expert network. The approach from manifold fields can contribute to accuracy. Considering the nature of conflict prevention, which is that one can hardly know whether a potential conflict was prevented or not, the disputes between skeptics and the affirmative seem to continue.

Works Cited

 

1. Matveeva, A. (2006) Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas. The Hague, European Centre for Conflict Prevention.

2. Rupesinghe, K. (2005) "A New Generation of Conflict Prevention: Early Warning, Early Action and Human Security". Paper presented at the Global Conference on the "Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict and Peacebuilding", 19-21st July 2005.

3. Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2005) Contemporary conflict resolution. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Polity Press.

4. Lund, 1996, FEWER, 1999, Schmeidl, 2001, cited in Schmeidl, S. with Lopez, E. P. (2002) Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action. London, Swiss Peace Foundation and International Alert. Available: http://www.international-alert.org/publications/80.php

5. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992) Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General, adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June. New York, United Nations.

6. Post-Conflict Risks (CSAE WPS/2006-12), Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, 2006 (17 August) Available: www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2006-12text.pdf.

7. Schmeidl, S. with Lopez, E. P. (2002) Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action. London, Swiss Peace Foundation and International Alert. Available: http://www.international-alert.org/publications/80.php

8. Carnegie Commision on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997) Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report. New York, Carnegie Corporation.

9. Rupesinghe, K., Nyheim, D. with Khan, M. (2001) "A Review of Research and Practice in Early Warning and Early Response: Lessons Learned and Policy Issues." In Alker, H. R., Gurr, T. & Rupesinghe, K. (eds) Journeys Through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Ch.13.

10. Austin, A. (2004) "Early Warning and the Field: a Cargo Cult Science?" Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Available: http://www.berghof-handbook.net/

11. Krummenacher, H. & Schmeidl, S. (2001) Practical Challenges in Predicting Violent Conflict. FAST: An Example of a Comprehensive Early-Warning. Available:

12. http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Working_Paper/working_paper_34.pdf.

13. Rupesinghe, K. with Anderlini, S. N. (1998) Civil Wars, Civil Peace: An Introduction to Conflict Resolution. London, Pluto Press.

14. Moore, H. W. & Gurr, T. (1998) Assessing Risks of Ethnorebellion in the Year 2000: Three Empirical Approachs. In Schmeidl, S. & Adelman, H. (eds) (1998). Early Warning and Early Response. Columbia International Affairs Online, Columbia University Press.

15. Brecke, P. (2000) Risk Assessment Models and Early Warning Systems. Arbeitsgruppe, Internationale Plitik.

16. Harff, B. & Gurr, T. (1998) "Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies." Journal of Peace Research, 35, pp. 551-79.

17. Bond, D., Jenkins, J.C., Taylor, C. L. et al. (2003) "Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA): An Event Typology for Automated Events Data Development." Journal of Peach Research, vol. 40, no. 6, pp.733-745.

18. Anderson, M. (2004) "Experiences with Impact Assessment: Can We Know What Good We Do." Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. Available: http://www.berghof-handbook.net/

19. Stewart, E. (2003) "Conflict Prevention: Consensus or Confusion?". Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal, June, pp. 1-17.

20. Van de Goor, L. & Verstegen, S. (1999) Conflict Prognostication: Part 1 Bridging the Gap from Early Warning to Early Response. The Hague, Netherlands Institute of Internal Relations.

21. Stedman, S. (1995) "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling ‘preventive diplomacy'". Foreign Affairs, 74 (May/June), pp. 14-20.

22. Zartman, W. (2001) "Preventing Deadly Conflict." Security Dialogue, 32(2), pp.137 154.

23. Bond, D., Jenkins, J.C., Taylor, C. L. et al. (2003) "Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA): An Event Typology for Automated Events Data Development." Journal of Peach Research, vol. 40, no. 6, pp.733-745.

24. Jenkins, J. Craig; Marianne Abbott & Charles L.Taylor, 2002. ‘Constructing International Conflict Indicators: A Reliability Assessment of Automated Coding for The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators IV ', paper presented at the 43rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 24 27 March. Cited in Bond, D., Jenkins, J.C., Taylor, C. L. et

[1] Louise Arbour, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was accused of turning her office into a "deified oracle which spews out edicts we all must follow. Some supporters of Israel have called her an idiot. The Bush administration, too, has objected to her frequent complaints about its use of torture, secret arrests and disregard of international law as part of the campaign against terrorism." The New York Times. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/world/europe/06arbour.html?fta=y

 

Project Details

Supporting organization: 

The Foundation for Co-Existence

Project Assessment

Financial support: 

No

Sustainability Model: 

We have the ability to fundraise for the new model as an attachment to an existing EW/ER program on the ground under the Foundation for Co-Existence.

Expertise needed: 

Technical Expertise: Technical support to design a secure information gathering, dissemination and analysis on violence and violations.